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1. INTRODUCTION
We tend to take language for granted. The ease with which children learn to speak – and 
our fluency as adults – fools us into thinking it is simple. Even when some find reading and 
writing difficult to learn, the literate among us still assume that some simple problem stands 
in the way of picking up these apparently easy skills.
But language is not simple. In fact Morten H Christiansen and Simon Kirby have gone so far 
as to call it the hardest problem in science.1 Despite centuries of expertise with the formalities 
of language, and fifty years of modern scientific linguistic research, nobody really knows how 
human language works.  Noam Chomsky, the instigator of modern approaches to language 
(which are generally inspired by him or reactions against him) has yet to completely describe 
the so-called Universal Grammar which his theory posits to exist inside every human brain. Nor 
has anyone else come up with a coherent theory that comprehensively explains the data. 
There is plenty of data, though. Linguists have collected details on languages from all over 
the world. Patterns have emerged, but the linguistic database remains fragmented.
I am applying a relatively new method for the study of language that has appeared only in the 
last few years. This method assumes that at least some parts of language can be explained 
in terms of other aspects of our psychology. formal linguists, such as the Chomskyans, tend 
to base their theories solely on linguistic data. This leads very easily to a belief that language 
is self-contained, its rules essentially arbitrary.
Cognitive linguists like Ronald W Langacker3 and george Lakoff4 reacted against Chomsky. 
They believe that linguistic structure is entirely due to psychological phenomena that in the 
past were not considered pertinent to the study of language. Cognitive linguists argue that 
the meaning of language is tied to human mental processes, not the world viewed in some 
objective fashion. According to this view a wide range of psychological phenomena, from 
perception to “higher” cognition like metaphorical reasoning, constrain language and leave 
their stamp in its design. In this case it makes sense to look to psychology for insights into 
language.
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I look particularly to the sensorimotor system, the nuts-and-bolts part of the brain that controls 
perception and action at a concrete level. I believe there is good reason to bring this basic 
system into the study of language. This is a bold claim, given the apparent disparity between 
these two fields, and in the remainder of this paper I hope to convince you of its validity. First 
I will briefly cover some general arguments for such a position. Then I will present a specific 
hypothesis linking grammatical number (singular, plural, etc.) to perceptual grouping processes 
in the visual system. I am developing a computational model to explore this hypothesis, and 
will present some interim results that I believe bolster my claim.
. LANgUAgE AND THE SENSORIMOTOR SySTEM
Language is conventionally considered as one of several independent faculties, or modules, 
within the brain. Jerry fodor is associated with an extreme version of this5, in which language 
in particular is an isolated component of the mind, communicating with other components 
through strictly controlled channels. By talking of language as a module here, I mean that all 
of the representations and processing required for language are partitioned off from other 
parts of the brain. The language module can then be viewed as a black box, which takes in 
sensory input and produces abstract ‘ideas’, or takes ‘ideas’ and converts them into speech 
or gestures. This conventional view is illustrated in figure 1(a). Ray Jackendoff has noted 
that though this is a common view among linguists and others, it is unnecessary. Chomsky 
himself identified this strict view early on and rejected it.6 He distinguished between functions 
and the way they were implemented in the brain. This allows one to talk about the language 
faculty as a separate functional entity, as shown in figure 1(a), even though it might share 
parts of the brain with other mental modules. 
Ray Jackendoff, a former student of Chomsky, presents an alternative view of this isolation. 
He also views language as a distinct module, but emphasises the interaction of all cognitive 
modules – in particular the way interacting modules constrain one another.7 This interaction 
allows the language module to be affected by other cognitive modules far more than the 
conventional view allows. While the language module may be autonomous, it is constrained 
by information fed to it by other modules. This approach assumes the same structure as the 
strictly modular view, but also considers the interactions between modules.
An elegant example of how the sensory system can influence language this way is the cross-
linguistic research conducted by Brent Berlin and Paul Kay on colour names.8 They found that 
languages with only two basic colour names used them to label black and white (or, more 
correctly, dark and light). Languages with three colour names labelled these plus red. In 
languages with more colour names those with the same number of basic names used them 
to label the same colours, with little variation. What’s more, the actual colours (measured 
objectively based on the frequency of light) were the same when labelled in different languages. 
Kay and Chad K McDaniel later found that these key frequencies corresponded to the maximum 
sensitivity of the cells in the retina that detect colour.9 Nobody contends that the eye is part 
of an autonomous language module. But the visual cortex perceives colour as interpreted 
by the retina, which constrains how other parts of the brain represent colour. Thus in a very 
basic way language can be influenced by our physiology – even aspects of physiology usually 
considered remote from language.
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The alternative is for the language module to be less than autonomous in the brain. figure 
1(b) illustrates how this could work, with the language faculty sharing some of its components 
with other faculties, such as the sensorimotor system. Why should one believe such a thing 
possible or likely, especially since language and perception or motor action seem so unrelated? 
There are, I think, some good reasons. Natural selection is a very good recycler.10 New 
functionality evolves by modification of existing structures. The wings of a bat are modified 
legs, for example. Such changes can lead to great complexity when combined with duplication. 
Consider insects, whose bodies consist of a series of segments, each performing a different 
function (antennae, eyes, legs, and so on), but all derived from the same basic pattern. It 
makes sense that functionality in the brain would emerge in a similar way, so that the neural 
machinery for language would emerge from a part of the brain structured for some other 
job. This might occur if an older structure was duplicated and freed from its original purpose. 
Language might even end up sharing parts of the brain with the older function. In either case 
we would expect that the original function might leave its stamp on the language faculty.
So from an evolutionary perspective I think it quite sensible to look to other aspects of 
cognition to help throw light on language, and the sensorimotor system is a good candidate. 
After all, much of what we use language to talk about are the objects and relationships we 
perceive around us, and the actions we take in the world. Langacker’s early work in cognitive 
linguistics11 was aimed at motivating the distinction between nouns and verbs as a distinction 
between regions (of real or abstract spaces) and processes, aping the way humans perceive 
the world.
3. BACKgROUND TO My HyPOTHESIS
I am looking for a causal link between an aspect of sensorimotor processing and a corresponding 
aspect of the structure of language. In particular, I am interested in how knowledge about 
the way the visual system attends to and categorises objects might be brought to bear on 
the structure of noun phrases. Noun phrases are phrases built around nouns that can serve 
as grammatical subjects and objects. for example, “a dog”, “some trees” and “John” are 
simple noun phrases. They are the linguistic structures employed to describe actual objects 
in the world (among other things).
In the remainder of this paper I am going to discuss a psychological model of the way that 
groups of objects are classified in the visual system, which I believe can also be used to 
explain the syntax of noun phrases – at least the aspects relating to number. But before I get 
into the details, I need to give a bit of background, on the psychological and linguistic fronts, 
and define my terms. What exactly do I mean by the visual system; and what exactly is this 
concept of number in language? I will deal with the second point first.
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figure 1 (b):  the view of language that I am suggesting. Some subsystems 
are shared between language and other mental faculties.
figure 1(a):   the traditional view of the language faculty in relation to other 
mental faculties. Language exists as a separate module within the brain.
figure 1
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3.1 Linguistic Number
Number comes up in a few places in language – obviously in the case of words like one, two, 
three, and more complicated phrases like four million, two hundred and six. It also comes 
up in quantifiers like some, lots and many. But the manifestation that I am interested in is 
the so-called number feature that attaches itself to nouns and verbs. In English, for example, 
there is a difference between singular and plural noun phrases: “the dog” versus “the dogs”. 
furthermore, the subject of a sentence and its verb must agree in the number feature: “The 
dog runs away” versus “*The dogs runs away”.1 This distinction suggests that there are at least 
two separate components to nouns: the noun itself indicating a class, and the number feature 
indicating whether one or more members of the class are intended. In an introductory text on 
the subject, Haspelmath13 notes that the regularity of number marking is best represented 
as a rule for combining two separate elements. The linking of the number feature with verbs 
also suggests it has a life independent of its noun, as it were. 
Other languages exhibit even more variations of the number feature; features that indicate 
the speaker is referring to precisely two things, or three things. But across languages there are 
some generalisations that can be made which allow English to serve as a reasonable model 
for language generally. In those languages which do divide noun phrases up by number, the 
distinction between singular and plural seems to be most basic.14 What causes singular and 
plural noun phrases to be marked differently? 
According to one view, this distinction is entirely arbitrary and reflects arbitrary organisation 
of the language faculty. This is the default Chomskyan position. But even the Chomskyans 
are willing to accept the possibility that the distinction is driven by organisation of other brain 
mechanisms – such as the visual system.
 3. The visual System
We have gained a broad idea of how the human visual system works. visual information 
passes from the eyes to the visual cortex at the back of the brain where processing begins. 
D H Hubel and T N Wiesel originally found that neurons in the visual cortex respond to particular 
primitive features: edges and corners either still or moving in certain directions.15 Ungerleider 
and Mishkin found that processing then splits into two streams.16 The dorsal stream runs into 
the parietal cortex and is generally associated with attention and location. The ventral stream 
passes into the temporal cortex and is associated with classification. Melvyn A Goodale and 
A David Milner note striking evidence for the distinction.17 Neurological patients with damage 
to the temporal lobe, for example, may be incapable of naming objects (i.e., classifying them) 
but still able to interact with them in a generic way. More recent methods have allowed an 
even closer look at classification in humans. Kalanit Grill-Spector and Rafael Malach, in a 
review of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies of the visual cortex, reveal 
that certain parts of the ventral visual cortex respond to different categories of stimuli, such 
as faces, places and animals.18
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figure (a):   Space-based attention. figure (b):   feature-based attention.
figure  (c):   Scale-based attention.
figure 
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3..1 visual Attention
Attention, for psychologists, is quite a nebulous term which hides a great deal of complexity. It 
can apply equally to the meanest operations of peripheral processing and the highest levels 
of conscious thought. In everyday life we use it in the latter sense, but I want to talk about a 
more restricted sense – visual attention. By doing this I am limiting myself to methods that 
the brain uses to ensure one aspect of the visual field receives more emphasis, or processing, 
than the rest. Some examples should suffice to show what I mean. 
figure (a) shows an example of space-based attention. This is a conventional conception 
of visual attention.19 The bright patch in the figure indicates the region attended to. Stimuli 
falling within are attended to – though what this entails is not certain. It is generally assumed 
that the entire field of view is too complicated to process at once, and attention decides which 
part of it should be processed. Attention then acts like a filter, picking out parts of a scene 
for close examination.
Space-based attention is not the only kind of visual attention, though. figure (b) shows an 
example of feature-based attention. feature here means primitive visual features, such as the 
direction, colour or length of line segments. In figure (b) horizontal and vertical lines are the 
features attended to, picking out the Ls and Ts from the Xs. Note that although in the figure 
the letters are picked out by a bright circle, it is the features – the horizontal and vertical lines 
– that are picked out, irrespective of their location in the visual field. Feature-based attention 
is a more recent discovery than space-based attention, but its reality has emerged from 
psychological work on visual search, notably Anne M Treisman and garry gelade’s feature 
Integration Theory0. Such work shows that in certain circumstances a target object can be 
made to ‘pop out’ from a field of distracting objects based on feature differences without 
observers having to scan each object with space-based attention.
figure (c) shows a further, more controversial, example of visual attention, which I have 
labelled scale-based attention. This refers to bias within the visual system to respond to 
stimuli of a particular size, the large letters in the figure. Evidence for this kind of attention 
comes from studies into global precedence, a term coined by David Navon1 to describe the 
tendency for the global stimulus to swamp local components. In pictures like figure 3 Navon 
found that the global figure (the A) interferes with tasks relating to the local figures (the Xs), 
slowing them down or increasing errors. However the xs do not interfere with tasks relating to 
the A. This suggests that the visual system can choose to consider stimuli only at particular 
scales, though this kind of attention might not be as flexible as the others described above. 
further evidence of scale-based attention comes from work by J vincent filoteo, frances J 
friedrich and John L Stricker, who found subjects were slower to respond to a stimulus at a 
different level (global or local, as in figure 3) from the previous stimulus. This effect seemed 
to be independent of spatial attention.
There is a further useful distinction within attention. Endogenous, or top-down, attention is 
the term applied to attention directed from within. By contrast, exogenous, or bottom-up, 
attention is driven by the stimulus. Something that catches the eye stimulates exogenous 
attention; endogenous attention results from an internal choice. 
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figure 3:  A typical stimulus used to demonstrate global precedence.
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3.2.2 Classification
The classification of visual stimuli is an important problem in psychology and artificial 
intelligence, and one that has not yet been adequately solved. Progress has been made in 
some applications (such as optical character recognition used to read text), but the human 
ability to pick out and classify objects under a wide range of conditions eludes us as yet.
Object classification appears to go on in the ventral stream. Location information seems 
to be a dorsal stream specialty, so that classification in the ventral stream need not worry 
about where things are. All it need do is classify objects (presumably just the ones currently 
attended to). This is borne out by looking at the brain, where it is found that as one follows 
the ventral stream neurons respond to ever-larger regions of the retina. This implies that 
ventral stream processing is spatially or location invariant – it does not care where objects 
are. Obviously classification must also be scale invariant – it must be able to classify objects 
correctly no matter what their apparent size on the retina, and neurons in the ventral stream 
also seem to have this ability.3
I am interested in classification because it interacts with the attention system. Attention is 
supposed to filter raw visual input for later processing, and classification makes up a major 
part of that later processing.
4.  A COMPUTATIONAL MODEL Of vISUAL ATTENTION AND CLASSIfICATION
Figure 4 illustrates the components of a model that I hope can link classification and attention 
to linguistic number. It is a model of part of the human visual system, based on widely used 
biologically plausible computational simulations. As the figure shows, after early processing, 
flow of information splits into the ventral and dorsal streams (analogous to vision in humans), 
and I will follow this broad division in the following discussion.
4.1 Early Processing
The model takes as input raw images. In reality this would be light impinging on the retina, here 
it can be thought of as a small bitmap image. This image is processed by a set of visual filters 
that model the effect of neurons in the primary visual cortex. The output of this processing 
is a set of feature maps.4 Each feature map has the same spatial layout as the input (it is 
retinotopic) but instead of each point indicating light intensity, it indicates the strength of a 
particular feature. Each feature map corresponds to a different feature.
for example, one feature map might be sensitive to short vertical lines, so that ‘bright’ points 
on it would indicate places where the input image contains short vertical lines. Another feature 
map might be sensitive to short horizontal lines, another to short lines at a 45° angle. feature 
maps sensitive to short lines are good for dealing with small objects, but other feature maps 
are sensitive to long lines, better for examining large objects. My model only extracts features 
based on line direction and length, but in reality many other kinds of features are available, 
like colour. 
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4.2 The Classifier: A Convolutional Neural Network
The classifier I have chosen is known as a convolutional neural network (CNN). Yan LeCun 
has made this a popular classifier for character classification.5 My CNN, however, is based 
on the work of Michael C Mozer and Mark Sitton where it played a role in a computational 
model of attention.6
Mozer and Sitton were interested in the CNN because it resembles the kind of neural structures 
in early vision. The CNN takes as input a group of feature maps and produces as output a 
category. In between a series of layers reduce the feature maps to the category. Each layer 
consists of two parts: a convolving part, which extracts local feature combinations from its 
input, and an abstracting part, which reduces the size of the feature map. In my current 
implementation, for example, the input is eight feature maps, each measuring 31 x 31 pixels. 
The output from the first layer of the CNN is twelve feature maps (each feature being some 
combination of the eight input features) measuring 15 x 15 pixels. The output from the CNN 
is one feature map for each category containing only one ‘pixel’ which is active if the CNN 
detects an instance of that category. 
The CNN learns the relationships between input shapes and categories using a conventional 
connectionist learning algorithm.7
The CNN has several notable characteristics. Mozer and Sitton were aware of its ability to 
abstract across the visual field, and so to classify objects at different locations. But this also, 
critically, allows it to classify homogeneous groups of objects. It cannot, however, reliably 
classify more than one type of object at a time, and so cannot deal with heterogeneous groups. 
It can also be trained to classify objects at different scales. A cluster of triangles produces the 
same output as a single triangle, and a small triangle produces the same output as a large 
triangle. Mixed objects – triangles and squares, for example, generally produce no output at all. 
So the CNN appears to be invariant to scale, location and number. As mentioned above, scale 
and space invariance are known properties of the human visual system. Number invariance 
is not, but is a prediction of my model. figure 5 shows the CNN at work. 
Figures 5(a) and 5(b) show classification of a small and large object, respectively. As expected, 
the classifier produces the correct answer when attending to the correct scale. The incorrect 
scale gives a nonsense answer, a ‘best-guess’, presumably. This is probably a result of training 
only with positive examples, such as always presenting a big shape when classifying at the 
large scale. By adding negative training examples -- in which there are no big shapes, in this 
case -- this problem could probably be eliminated.
In Figure 5(c) the large triangle is correctly classified, but the small shapes are not the same, 
and so the classifier produces no category. Mozer and Sitton noticed this, and used it to bolster 
their claim that spatial attention is necessary for adequate classification by concentrating on 
one object at a time. But in figure 5(d), a very similar image made of identical small shapes, 
the classifier categorises them collectively as square. Mozer and Sitton did not notice this 
exception.
finally, figure 5(e) shows that the network responds to groups of shapes at the small scale 
no matter where they are in the input. 
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figure 4:  A diagram showing the major components of the model. 
Rounded boxes indicate representations of data, other boxes indicate 
processes. Arrows indicate flow of information.
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The output from the classifier (which is either an object category – square, triangle, etc. – or 
nothing, indicating it could not classify the input) forms one of the outputs of the model, the 
object type.
4.3 Attention
Two attention systems also use the feature maps, as shown on the right of figure 4. The 
space-based attention system uses feature maps to work out which regions contain interesting 
stimuli and the order in which these should be attended to. This is a common approach to 
spatial attention similar to that employed, for instance, by Jeremy M Wolfe8 and Laurent Itti 
and Christof Koch9 in their computational models. The scale-based attention system performs 
a similar job to select the best scale to operate at, and this is the result of my own work. 
These attention components also receive input from the control mechanism. This control 
mechanism can therefore direct attention to particular regions or scales, or at least influence 
those chosen from the feature maps. These two inputs to the attention modules correspond 
to endogenous and exogenous attention. 
Attention limits what reaches the classifier from the feature maps, just as in Mozer and 
Sitton’s model.30 In figure 4 this is performed in the gating component. After gating, only 
features that lie within the attended region and are of the attended scale (big or small) pass 
through to the classifier. The classifier then uses these features to decide what kind of object 
it is looking at. 
4.4 The Control Mechanism
The classifier also signals its status to the control mechanism, indicating whether it can 
successfully classify its input or not. The control mechanism, by consulting the classification 
results and the attention system produces the other output of the model, the object number. 
This output only appears once the classifier produces a definite category. Until then, the control 
mechanism manipulates the attended region and scale until the gated features do produce 
a category from the classifier. Once a category appears the control mechanism can produce 
a number output, as laid out in Table 1 (at the end of part 4 below).
Simply stated, if the control mechanism detects a discrepancy between the size of the attended 
region and the attended scale it concludes that multiple objects are present.
The control mechanism is key to operation of the model, as an example of the model’s 
operation will make clear. Consider the input of figure 5(d). When presented to the model, the 
input image will first be processed into feature maps. At the beginning, no region is marked in 
the saliency map, meaning nothing reaches the classifier. The attention systems immediately 
go to work, though. The spatial attention module will identify the region of the large triangle 
as interesting. The scale attention module will identify the large scale as interesting. This is 
determined purely by the stimulus, without control mechanism intervention.
Now that the saliency map contains a region and scale, the gating module can filter the 
input into the classifier. Gating passes on feature maps corresponding to large features and 
everything corresponding to the large triangle. The classifier produces a classification of 
TRIANGLE, which appears at the object type output. The classifier also informs the control 
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Figure 5:  Examples of output from the classifier. No spatial filtering is applied 
(as would be done by space-based attention), but scale filtering is applied (as 
would be done by scale-based attention). The results of classifying a “small” 
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mechanism of a successful match. The control mechanism consults the attention modules, 
finds that a large region has been classified as a large object, and from the rules in Table 1 
produces ONE at the object number output. 
This is not the end, though. Now the control mechanism commands the scale attention module 
to shift to smaller scale, without altering the region attended to by the spatial attention module. 
The gating module passes on feature maps corresponding to small features, and the classifier 
output changes to ARROW. The control mechanism, seeing a successful classification, consults 
its rules and produces MANy at the object number output. 
further operations are possible, too. Consider the input in figure 5(c) instead. In this case the 
last operation would have failed because the classifier cannot classify all the small shapes 
at once. But now the control mechanism might order the spatial attention module to locate 
smaller regions of interest, and constrain attention sufficiently that it could classify a single 
small shape. This could be repeated as necessary. 
The control mechanism produces its object number output quite separately from the object 
type produced by the classifier. Though there is limited communication between these two 
modules, they are quite distinct – figure 4 shows them belonging to different processing 
streams (and so different parts of the brain). The outputs are independent of each other 
– in the same way that noun and number are independent in language. Indeed, one might 
speculate that the first example above corresponds to generation of the phrase ‘triangle of 
arrows’. 
The requirements of the control mechanism go beyond the simple relationship of Table 1, 
involving sequencing and decision making. While it might be possible to construct a system 
that followed these rules from scratch, it would not necessarily be consistent with the reality 
of attention in humans. 
Instead, I am seeking a psychologically motivated system that not only reproduces the rules, 
but also exhibits other known attention phenomena. I hope the model will be able to reproduce 
global precedence and visual search results.31 The attention and control mechanism form 
the focus of current and future work. 
Table 1:  The rules used by the control mechanism of my model to work out the object number 
output. The attended region size and attended scale come from the attention modules, as 
shown in Figure 4. Once the attended input has been classified the control mechanism can 
output an object number. 
 Attended region Attended Scale Object number
 Big Big ONE
 Big Small MANy
 Small Small ONE
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5.  CONCLUSION
I have outlined general principles by which the language faculty can be grounded in the working 
of the brain. These suggest it may be profitable to explore conventionally non-linguistic aspects 
of cognition to shed light on how language works. In this spirit I presented my own model, 
which explores the psychology of visual attention and classification as a cause of linguistic 
structure. My model produces an object type output from the classifier, and an object number 
output from the attention and control mechanisms. These outputs (from a purely visual 
model) correspond neatly to the noun and number marker, respectively, in linguistic models. 
The one and many division of the model’s object number output correspond to singular and 
plural markers in language. In addition, my model produces these outputs in different places, 
mirroring the separation of their linguistic counterparts.
As discussed earlier, there are two ways that vision could affect language. If something like 
the outputs of my model are the only information available to the language faculty, then it 
makes sense that the linguistic structures produced correspond closely to the model. 
Alternatively, language could be partly ‘piggy-backed’ on older cognitive systems, like vision. 
In this scenario the parts of the brain responsible for visual processing would also be part 
of the language system, as in figure 1(b). Humans clearly are not limited in their numerical 
ability to the one-many distinction, yet this distinction forms a mandatory part of language. 
This would make sense if the language module was serendipitously attached to a more 
primitive kind of numerical cognition, corresponding to my model, rather than more modern, 
sophisticated systems.
Either way, my account is firmly within the cognitive camp, since it explains the meaning of 
linguistic structure in terms of mental processes, rather than objects in the world (though 
those mental processes are supposed to be relevant to the world around us, of course). Non-
cognitive accounts instead try to tie linguistic phenomena either to a logical representation 
of reality, or to nothing at all. 
I have presented the model whole, though I have as yet only implemented the early processing, 
classifier and parts of the attention modules. I must complete and evaluate the model properly 
before drawing any firm conclusions. I am hopeful, however, from work completed so far, that 
the model will be capable of the behaviour described and provide a plausible explanation of 
the distinction between plurality and singularity in language.
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